

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 07761 01 OF 02 212125Z
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DHA-05 ERDE-00 NRC-05 CIAE-00
DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00
IGA-02 ERDA-05 AID-05 CEA-01 COME-00 EB-08 FPC-01
H-01 INR-07 INT-05 L-03 OMB-01 PM-05 OES-07
SP-02 SS-15 STR-05 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 FEA-01 /106 W
-----064789 212153Z /21

O R 212030Z SEP 77
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3827
AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO
INFO AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 BRASILIA 7761

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, BR, US
SUBJ: BACKGROUND, RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF GOB
DENUNCIATION

REF: BRASILIA 2018, 2090, 2022

1. BACKGROUND FOR GOB ACTION:
THE GOB ACTION OF SEPTEMBER 19 IS THE CULMINATION
OF A PROCESS THAT BEGAN IN THE MID-SIXTIES, ACCELERATED
SIGNIFICANTLY AFTER THE GEISEL ADMINISTRATION CAME TO
POWER IN EARLY 1974, AND REACHED ITS CLIMAX WITH THE
CHALLENGES OF THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION TO THE GOB IN THE
FIELDS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

2. THE ARRAY OF REASONS, HISTORICAL AND CURRENT, FOR
THE MOST RECENT GOB ACTIONS IS DESCRIBED IN THE EMBASSY'S
THREE-PART ANALYSIS, CONTAINED IN BRASILIA'S 2018, 2090
AND 2022, OF THE STATE OF THE US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONSHIP
AFTER THE GOB'S RENUNCIATION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND
DENUNCIATION OF THE 1952 MILITARY AGREEMENT, MEASURES
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 07761 01 OF 02 212125Z

THAT WERE THE PRECURSORS OF THE SEPTEMBER 19 NOTE. SINCE
THAT ANALYSIS IS STILL ENTIRELY RELEVANT WITH RESPECT TO
UNDERLYING FACTORS, THE QUESTION TO BE ADDRESSED HERE IS
NOT ROOT CAUSES BUT RATHER THE TIMING OF THE MOST RECENT
ACTIONS: WHY NOW?

3. SOON AFTER THE MARCH RENUNCIATION/DENUNCIATION, THE

GOB UNDERTOOK A THROUGHGOING REVIEW OF THE US-BRAZILIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP. OVER RECENT MONTHS THERE HAS BEEN AN ACCUMULATION OF EVIDENCE THAT INDICATED, IN THE NET, THAT THE RESULT OF THE STUDY WOULD BE THE DISMANTLEMENT OF THE EXISTING BILATERAL MILITARY STRUCTURE. MOST OF OUR INFORMATION INDICATED, HOWEVER, THAT DEFINITIVE ACTION WOULD NOT BE TAKEN UNTIL AFTER NOVEMBER. OUR WORKING HYPOTHESIS WAS THAT THE DECISION WOULD BE HELD OFF UNTIL THE RESULTS OF THE LATE OCTOBER VISIT OF SECRETARY VANCE WERE KNOWN. IF THE HYPOTHESIS WAS A REASONABLE ONE, WHY DID THE GOB ADVANCE THE TIMETABLE?

4. REASON FOR TIMING:

AS OF NOW, WE BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A MIX OF REASONS. WE JUDGE THAT, AS EVER, THE NUCLEAR QUESTION WAS A PROMINENT FACTOR. SPECIFICALLY, THE GOB HAS BEEN GETTING VERY EDGY ABOUT DELAYS IN USG ACTION ON THE FUEL FOR ANGRA I. IT IS REASONABLE TO SUPPOSE THAT, AS IN MARCH, THE GOB WISHED TO GIVE A SIGNAL IN CONNECTION WITH THE FUEL ISSUE (AND JUST POSSIBLY, THE INFCE MEETING). SECOND, WE BELIEVE THAT THE GOB MAY HAVE WANTED, FOR SEVERAL REASONS, TO ANNOUNCE A DECISION IN THE MILITARY AREA BEFORE, RATHER THAN AFTER, POSSIBLE HIGH-LEVEL US VISITS. IT MAY HAVE WANTED TO "CLEAR THE TERRAIN" SO AS TO ENABLE THE GOB TO CONDUCT HIGH-LEVEL TALKS WITH THE USG FROM A POSITION CLEANSSED OF ALL REMNANTS OF WHAT MANY IN THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BRASIL 07761 01 OF 02 212125Z

CONSIDER TO BE AN OUTMODED, ALMOST COLONIAL, MILITARY RELATIONSHIP; TO DEMONSTRATE AGAIN, IN ADVANCE, THE FIRMNESS OF ITS RESISTANCE TO US POLICIES AND ATTITUDES THAT "THREATEN BRAZILIAN INDEPENDENCE" OR CREATE OBSTACLES TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GRANDEZA; AND/OR TO ATTEMPT TO COUPLE A SHOW OF INDEPENDENCE TO THE PUBLIC DROPPING OF HINTS OF A VISIT BY PRESIDENT CARTER

AS AN EFFORT TO INDICATE US ACCEPTANCE OF THE BRAZILIAN POSTURE. (THE SILVEIRA TECHNIQUE HERE WAS ANALAGOUS TO THE CRUDE EFFORT MADE IN LATE MARCH TO EXPLOIT THE MARCH 25 LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CARTER IN CONNECTION WITH THE CLOSING OF CONGRESS). THIRD, THE GOB MAY HAVE BELIEVED THAT ANOTHER STEP IN THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS COULD EVOKE A REACTION FAVORABLE TO THE GOB AND AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION FROM CONSERVATIVE SECTORS OF US PUBLIC OPINION, ALREADY MOBILIZED ON THE CANAL ISSUE. THE GOB MAY HAVE REASONED THAT SUCH A REACTION WOULD BE GOOD NOT ONLY IN THE LONGER TERM BUT ALSO IN RELATION TO HIGH-LEVEL VISITS. FOURTH, THE TIMING MAY HAVE HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE RETIREMENT ON SEPTEMBER 21 OF GENERAL POTYGUARA, THE CHIEF OF EMFA, AN INVETERATE ANTI-AMERICAN FORCE, AND THE PRINCIPAL AUTHOR OF THE RECOMMENDATION TO

CLOSE JBUSMC. GIVEN POTYGUARA'S NATURE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT HE WISHED THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DECISION AS A PARTING GIFT. THIS CONSIDERATION WOULD BE ONLY A MAKE-WEIGHT FACTOR, HOWEVER. FIFTH, IT IS ALWAYS USEFUL IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS TO RAISE THE BANNER OF "INDEPENDENCE". SIXTH, IT IS TRUE THAT, IN SOME RESPECTS, THE MEASURES OF SEPTEMBER 19 ARE AT LEAST PLAUSIBLE FOLLOW-ONS TO THOSE OF MARCH 4 AND MARCH 11. FINALLY, THE GOB IN GENERAL AND THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY IN PARTICULAR ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE DIRECTION OF ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY ON THE PROVISION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TO ALL BUT TRULY CRITICAL COUNTRIES.

5. THE MANNER IN WHICH THE GOB HAS HANDLED THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BRASIL 07761 01 OF 02 212125Z

SEPTEMBER 19 DECISION IS RELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF IMMEDIATE MOTIVES. UP TO NOW, THE GOB HAS MADE A GOOD EFFORT TO MAINTAIN THE LINE THAT THE DECISION WAS A NATURAL SEQUENTIAL ONE, THAT IT IS AN EXPRESSION OF BRAZIL'S INDEPENDENCE, AND THAT IT DOES NOT REPRESENT A DETERIORATION

OF RELATIONS. THE FINAL PART OF THE NOTE IS BEING GIVEN A CERTAIN EMPHASIS, AS SILVEIRA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR IT WOULD BE. THE MARKED CONTRAST WITH THE HIGH-KEY EMOTIONALISM OF MARCH MAY BE THE RESULT OF LESSONS LEARNED THEN, OF A DESIRE NOT TO RISK POISONING THE ATMOSPHERE FOR HIGH-LEVEL VISITS, AND OF THE SOMEWHAT LESSENEED NEED FOR WHIPPING UP POPULAR SUPPORT.

6. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE US: IN TERMS OF US MILITARY SECURITY, THIS CULMINATION OF THE PROCESS THAT BEGAN IN THE MID-SIXTIES DOES NOT REPRESENT A MATERIAL CHANGE. OUR LITERAL STRATEGIC INTEREST IN BRAZIL HAS CENTERED ON THE BASES AND FACILITIES THAT MIGHT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO US IN EMERGENCIES AND IN THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS THE BRAZILIAN NAVY MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE IN THE PROTECTION OF LINES OF COMMUNICATION. THE EMBASSY HAS LONG HELD THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THESE ASSETS COULD BE REALIZED BY US SHORT

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BRASIL 07761 02 OF 02 212131Z

ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DHA-05 ERDA-05 NRC-05 CIAE-00
DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00
IGA-02 AID-05 CEA-01 COME-00 EB-08 FPC-01 H-01
INR-07 INT-05 L-03 OMB-01 PM-05 OES-07 SP-02
SS-15 STR-05 TRSE-00 ACDA-07 FEA-01 /106 W
-----064897 212153Z /21

O R 212030Z SEP 77

FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3828

AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO

INFO AMCONSUL SAO PAULO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 BRASILIA 7761

OF A DIRECT US-USSR CONFLICT AND THAT THEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE IN THAT CONTINGENCY. WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT PROSPECT IS CHANGED ONE WAY OR THE OTHER BY THE ACTION OF SEPTEMBER 19. WE HAVE ALSO PLACED CONSIDERABLE VALUE ON THE BROAD MILITARY ASSOCIATION AS AFFORDING POTENTIAL CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE TO THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY CONCERNING GENERAL US INTERESTS. THE PROBLEM HERE HAS BEEN TWO-FOLD: IN THE FIRST PLACE, THE BRAZILIAN MILITARY HAVE BEEN AT THE HEART OF OUR PROBLEMS IN THE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS FIELDS; AND, SECOND, THE CHANNELS OF INFLUENCE HAVE BEEN WORKED IN THE REVERSE DIRECTION, THAT IS, THE GOB HAS BEEN TRYING TO ENLIST SUPPORT FROM THE US ARMED FORCES IN BEHALF OF THEIR POSITIONS. IN ANY EVENT, THE ATTACHES, WHO REMAIN TO PERFORM THE INFLUENCE FUNCTION, HAVE, IN GENERAL, HAD GREATER IMPACT IN THIS AREA THAN USDEL JBUSMC.

7. WITH RESPECT TO THE BROADER ASPECTS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH BRAZIL, THE DECISION OF SEPTEMBER 19 DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A NEW, DIFFERENT OR DRAMATIC STEP. IT ONLY EMPHASIZES THE DIFFICULT NATURE OF THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BRASIL 07761 02 OF 02 212131Z

AS A DETERMINED BRAZIL PURSUES ITS GOAL OF INDEPENDENT POWER STATUS.

8. RECOMMENDED USG POSTURE: IT IS MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE TAKE THIS MOST RECENT GOB ACTION IN STRIDE, WITHOUT RECRIMINATIONS AND WITHOUT ALARM OR HAND-WRINGING. THE EMBASSY CAN ONLY REITERATE THE GENERAL RECOMMENDATION FOR A BUSINESS-AS-USUAL STANCE THAT IT MADE IN MARCH (BRASILIA 2222). IN THE IMMEDIATE TERM, WE SHOULD -- FOR EXAMPLE IN THE SECRETARY'S BILATERAL

WITH SILVEIRA -- LEAVE STRICTLY TO BRAZILIAN INITIATIVE
THE RAISING OF THE SEPTEMBER 19 DECISION OR THE QUESTION
OF THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN GENERAL. IF THE GOB
DOES BRING THE QUESTION UP, WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE LINE THAT,
OF COURSE, WE ACCEPT THE BRAZILIAN DECISION, AND, IF
ASKED, SHOULD STATE THAT WE WOULD BE PLEASED TO CONSIDER
ANY GOB PROPOSALS FOR SUBSTITUTE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE
MILITARY SECTOR. PLANS FOR HIGH-LEVEL VISITS SHOULD
PROCEED. FOR THE MIDDLE-TERM, THE PRESCRIPTIONS
CONTAINED IN BRASILIA 2222 ARE STILL EMINENTLY VALID AND
PERTINENT, EXCEPT THAT RIGHT NOW A FAVORABLE DECISION
ON THE ANGRA I FUEL IS PRESSING. ON THAT POINT, THE
EMBASSY IS SUBMITTING ITS RECOMMENDATIONS IN SEPTTEL.

9. OBVIOUSLY THE FOREGOING VIEWS MAY BE SUBJECT
TO SOME MODIFICATION OF EMPHASIS AS WE GATHER FURTHER
INFORMATION ABOUT THE INMOST THINKING OF THE GOB THAT
PRECEDED THE DECISION.
CRIMMINS

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: COLLECTIVE SECURITY, NUCLEAR AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 21-Sep-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977BRASIL07761
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770343-1039
Format: TEL
From: BRASILIA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770941/aaaabhyx.tel
Line Count: 243
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: fa778741-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 BRASILIA 2018
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07-Dec-2004 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 1198935
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BACKGROUND, RATIONALE AND IMPLICATIONS OF GOB DENUNCIATION
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, BR, US
To: STATE RIO DE JANEIRO
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/fa778741-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009